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INTRODUCTION
In their opposition brief, Defendants make two arguments for why they should be
allowed to recover fees for their opposition to IKON's preliminary injunction motion
(even though IKON's motion was denied and Defendants were never "wrongfully
enjoined" by it). First, Defendants attempt to characterize their opposition to IKON's
preliminary injunction motion as an effort to "dissolve" the TRO. This is factually
incorrect since Defendants never filed a motion to dissolve the TRO. Also the TRO
expired by its own terms and by operation of Rule 65A on the day in question without
any action by Defendants.
Second, Defendants argue in effect that this Court's "but for" rule for the recovery
of fees under Rule 65A (recoverable fees limited to those that would not have been
incurred "but for" the wrongful injunction) has no application to the instant case and
should have no impact on the fees sought by Defendants. This argument is without merit
and is contrary to this Court's decision in Tholen v. Sandy City. 489 P.2d 592 (Utah App.
1993). Defendants' argument would also overturn the "American Rule," and allow a
prevailing party to recover fees and costs whenever it prevails on a motion and without
having been "wrongfully enjoined" by any order issued by the court.

1

ARGUMENT
I.

RULE 65A(c) DOES NOT OVERTURN THE AMERICAN RULE,
BUT LIMITS RECOVERABLE DAMAGES AND FEES TO THOSE
CAUSED BY THE OPERATION OF A WRONGFULLY ISSUED
INJUNCTIVE ORDER.
Rule 65A(c) does not overturn the American Rule. Rather, it merely provides that

where a party has been "wrongfully enjoined/5 the party may recover those damages and
fees directly related to the injunctive order that was wrongfully issued. The Rule is
designed to ensure that a wrongfully enjoined party may recover those "costs, attorneys
fees or damage [incurred] as the result of any wrongful order or injunction." Utah R. Civ.
P. 65A(c). The Advisory Committee Note explains that paragraph (c) of the Rule is
intended to protect parties when they "suffer expense or damages from a wrongful
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A Advisory
Committee Note.
This Court has ruled that only those damages and fees "that arise from the
operation of the [wrongfully issued] injunction [or restraining order] itself may be
awarded under Rule 65A. Beard v. Dugdale. 741 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1987)
(emphasis added). Recently this Court reiterated that a "party is entitled only those
attorney fees incurred because of 'the application for, and issuance of, the [wrongful]
injunction."' Miller v. Martineau & Co.. C.P.A.. 983 P.2d 1107, 1116 (Utah App. 1999)
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(quoting Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P.2d at 597) (emphasis added). Recoverable fees are
only those incurred "in resisting the injunctive relief wrongfully entered against [a
party]." Miller, 983 P.2d at 1116 (emphasis added). See also Saunders v. Sharp. 793
P.2d 927, 933 (Utah App. 1990) (only fees "attributable to resisting the [wrongfully
issued] injunction" recoverable under Rule 65A).
Where the enjoined party actually moves to dissolve the wrongful injunctive order
and prevails, it may recover those "fees directly related to dissolution of the wrongful
injunction." Saunders. 793 P.2d at 933 (citing Artistic Hairdressers. Inc. v. Lew. 486
P.2d 482, 484 (Nev. 1971)). The facts of Artistic Hairdressers illustrate what is required
to recover fees on the basis of dissolving a wrongful order. In Artistic Hairdressers, a
TRO was entered and three days later the defendants "moved . . . to dissolve the
temporary restraining order." The court granted the defendants' motion and ordered the
dissolution of the TRO. 486 P.2d at 483-84. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's award of fees based on the defendants' motion to dissolve the TRO. In doing so,
the Nevada Supreme Court expressly held that "only" those fees "directly related" to the
defendants' motion to dissolve were recoverable. Id. at 484. The Court further explained
that if a defendant chooses not to seek the dissolution of the wrongful TRO, but pursues a
different strategy, such as opposing a subsequent motion for additional injunctive relief, it

3

cannot recover those subsequent fees because they would not be incurred in resisting a
wrongful injunctive order.
If the defendant, instead of attempting to remove the
temporary injunction, seeks rather to prevent the issuance of a
permanent injunction, or directs his efforts to defeating the
action of the plaintiff, the expense of counsel fees thus
incurred is an incident of the suit, and is not recoverable as
damages sustained by reason of the [wrongful] injunction.
Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, Defendants did not move to dissolve the TRO. Instead, they
opposed IKON's motion for a preliminary injunction and were successful. Rule 65A
does not permit recovery of such fees because they are unrelated to the TRO and because
Defendants were not "wrongfully enjoined" by an injunction that was never issued.
That Rule 65A does not overturn the American Rule is confirmed by this Court's
"but for" standard for recovery of fees. In Tholen v. Sandy City, this Court explained that
a party "is entitled only to those attorney fees which would not have been incurred but for
the application for, and issuance of, the preliminary injunction."

In contrast, "[f]ees

which would have been incurred anyway [in litigating the case] are not recoverable under
Rule 65 A." 849 P.2d at 597 (emphasis in original). If fees could be recovered when they
were not solely the result of a wrongfully issued injunctive order, fees would be
recoverable for ordinary litigation expenses and the American Rule would be overturned.
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Only those extra or additional fees that would not have been incurred "but for" the
issuance of the wrongful injunctive order may be recovered. In the instant case, the fees
incurred

by

Defendants

for

conferring

with

counsel,

doing

legal

research,

taking/defending depositions, etc. are ordinary expenses incurred in every case.
Additionally, because a preliminary injunction is separate and apart from a TRO (and
because IKON sought a preliminary injunction in addition to a TRO), fees incurred by
Defendants in opposing IKON's preliminary injunction motion cannot be attributed to the
TRO.

(Defendants' opposition to IKON's preliminary injunction motion was not a

vehicle for ending the TRO since the TRO lasted its full duration and Defendants did not
move to dissolve it.)

Thus, the fees incurred by Defendants in opposing IKON's

preliminary injunction motion are not recoverable for two reasons: they were not incurred
in connection with the TRO that "wrongfully" restrained Defendants, and they were
ordinary litigation expenses "which would have been incurred anyway." The American
Rule would be overturned if Rule 65A were allowed to be used to recover fees on the
basis of a motion for injunctive relief that is never granted or to recover fees that do not
meet the "but for" standard.
In sum, the language of Rule 65A, the Advisory Committee Note, and the
decisions of this Court make clear that Rule 65A does not permit recovery of fees

5

incurred in successfully opposing a motion for injunctive relief that is never issued by a
court. Accordingly, the "substantial attorneys' fees and costs" claimed by Defendants in
the instant case on the basis of their successfully "resisting IKON's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction" are not recoverable under Rule 65A. (Defendants' memorandum
to the trial court quoted in Brief of Appellant at 7.)
II.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO FEES ON THE THEORY
THAT THEY "DISSOLVED" THE TRO.
The TRO was initially issued for ten days and was later extended for an additional

ten days by stipulation of the parties.1 The extended TRO, by its own terms, came to an
end on July 9, 1997. See Exhibits B and C to Brief of Appellant. Defendants never filed
a motion to dissolve the TRO. Rather, IKON filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,
and on July 9, 1997 the trial court held a hearing on IKON's motion:
IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was heard by the
Court on July 9, 1997, pursuant to IKON's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction against the Defendants.
Exhibit B to Brief of Appellees at 2. At the end of a fiill-day evidentiary hearing, the trial
court granted Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict, finding that IKON had not
satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

Id. ("The Court . . . granted

* The fact that Defendants stipulated to the extension of the TRO is significant in that it
shows that Defendants did not seek to dissolve the TRO, as they now claim.
327076.2
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Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict and ruled that IKON had not met its burden of
proving the elements of Rule 65A(e)").
Defendants argue that they incurred fees in seeking to dissolve the TRO. Brief of
Appellees at 8. Defendants' contention is contradicted by the record. First, the extended
TRO ran its full duration through July 9, 1997. Second, Defendants did not file a motion
to dissolve the TRO. Third, the hearing held on July 9, 1997 was solely for the purpose
of considering IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

Exhibit B to Brief of

Appellees at 2.
Defendants attempt to escape from the above facts by claiming that at the end of
the "full-day evidentiary hearing on July 9, 1997" (when the TRO came to an end by its
own terms), they moved for a dissolution of the TRO. Brief of Appellees at 8, 11. This is
incorrect. Defendants cite to pages 428 and 454 of the Record (not attached to the Brief
of Appellees) which do not support their claim. Page 428 (Minute Entry) merely states
that Defendants sought a directed verdict on IKON's preliminary injunction motion.
Page 454 is the second page of the court's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Granting Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict, and states:
"Upon completion of IKON's presentation of its evidence, Defendants moved for a
Directed Verdict..." See Exhibits A and B hereto. Additionally, the court's Findings of

7

Fact state that Defendants moved for a directed verdict on IKON's preliminary injunction
motion, not for dissolution of the TRO. Exhibit B to Brief of Appellees at 2. While the
court's order did dissolve the TRO, that was surplussage given that the TRO ended on
that day by its own terms and by operation of Rule 65 A. In any case, the court did not
dissolve the TRO due to any motion to dissolve it because no such motion was filed by
Defendants.
Defendants also try to recharacterize their opposition to IKON's preliminary
injunction motion as an effort to dissolve the TRO by arguing that if IKON's preliminary
injunction motion had been granted "it is safe to say that Judge Stirba would have
continued the TRO." Brief of Appellees at 16. This argument is obviously incorrect.
IKON did not seek a continuation of the TRO. Moreover, Judge Stirba could not have
continued the TRO because Rule 65A would not have permitted such continuation. The
TRO had already been issued for a ten-day period and extended for an additional period.
It could not be extended further by the Court. Rule 65A states that a TRO "shall expire
by its own terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes,
unless within the time so fixed the order... is extended for a like period or unless the
[restrained] party . . . consents that it may be extended for a longer period." Utah R. Civ.
P. 65A(b)(2). The Rule allows a court to extend a TRO one time so long as it does so

327076.2
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"within the time so fixed/' i.e., within the original period of the TRO. The Rule c-n
give a court authority to extend a TRO a second Mine on* v n has

*

*

^•

either of the two ways uiuudnl In iii ihr l-'nli
Defendants finally argue that this Court ruled in Beard v. Dugdale that fees may be
awarded for opposition to a preliminary injunction motion even when the motion is not
granted. Brief of Appellees at 14
Beard decision is
resisting the iss

Defendants mischaracterize Beard, Nowti^it1 in tltc

ihul ivrs

.ivuiidnl In I IK* defendants for successfully

preliminary injunction. 741 P.2d at 969. In Beard, the TRO

was dissolved seven days after it was issued (presumably in response to a motion to
dissolve) and the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied

When I he

defendants subsequently sought In leenvri diinin^es inn! tees, Hie plaintiffs argued that
ihev

attorneys' fees." Id, (emphasis in original). The court

disagreed and awarded an amount of fees, but the published decision does not indicate the
basis or scope of the fees, beyond stating the general rule that recoverable damages and
fees are limited tn "those th:ii in**'1 ln»»n Ihe operation ol the injunction itself." Id.
mittphasis iidduli

In Jim I, beard does not stand for the proposition that fees may be

recovered under Rule 65A for opposing a preliminary injunction motion that is never
granted.

-*
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Defendants' position, were it accepted, would have a chilling effect on the conduct
of litigation. Parties would be penalized for seeking injunctive relief because they would
owe fees and costs even if the requested relief were denied. Currently, under Rule 65 A, a
party obtaining a wrongful injunction is responsible for those damages and fees that are
caused by its conduct. Under Defendants' theory, a party would be liable for fees and
costs even if its request for injunctive relief were denied and it did not wrongfully enjoin
anyone.2 If a party may recover fees and costs on the basis of its successful opposition to
injunctive relief that is never granted, few parties will risk seeking injunctive relief. Rule
65A was not intended to curtail judicial remedies in this way.
There is no basis in the law or the facts for Defendants to recover attorneys' fees
based on their successfully "resisting IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction"
(Defendants' memorandum to the trial court quoted in Brief of Appellant at 7).

^ Additionally, under Defendants' theory they could recover fees and costs for
successfully opposing a preliminary injunction motion even where a TRO had never been
granted or requested. Such is not the law. Regardless of whether or not a TRO was in
place, Defendants would have done the same work and incurred the same fees in
opposing IKON's preliminary injunctive motion. Given that IKON's motion was denied
and given that even Defendants admit where an injunctive "order is never issued, there
has been no wrongful restraint or injunction [on] which an award of attorneys' fees and
costs could be awarded," the mere fact that a prior TRO had been issued creates no basis
for recovery of fees and costs for Defendants' opposition to IKON's preliminary
injunction motion. (Defendants quoted in Brief of Appellant at 13.)
327076.2
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Defendants were never "wrongfully enjoined" by a preliminary injunction because tf i r
never granted. Defendants5 claim to have incurred Ices in :in eflort to "dissolve" the TRO
is withuiit merit because Defendants never filed a motion to dissolve the TRO and the
TRO remained in effect for its full, extended duration.
III.

DEFENDANTS DO NOT SATISFY THIS COURT'S "Bl I 1 OR"
STANDARD FOR RECOVERY OF FEES.
Any tf ,i nan\ ml Itr^ wider Rule 65A must satisfy this Court's "but for" standard.

Defendants make no attempt to satisfy this standard (nor did they at the trial court), but
instead argue in essence that the standard should not apply to the instant case

I "R lusis

of Defendants' position is simply that they wi nld not l»c ;ir>lc to ircovei all the fees they
seek if the standard wrrr applied

Brief of Appellees at 18. Because much of the fees at

issue were incurred in the ordinary way of litigation, Defendants fear that they will not be
awarded all their fees if they have to satisfy the "but for" standard. Defendants' feai that
the outcome would not be favorable tn diem ii, n *( a let'iliiiiate basis loi disregarding the
"but for" standard fnr (he ra oven- at fees.

Because Rule 65A is not intended to overturn the American Rule, it does not allow
for the recovery of fees that would have been incurred "anyway "

This ( outf lias

explained:
Although Rule 65A justifies awarding attorney fees Lo
wrongfully enjoined parties, those parties are only entitled to
11

fees . . . incurred in defending against wrongfully obtained
injunctive relief and not to fees incurred in litigating the
underlying lawsuit associated with an injunction
Fees
which would have been incurred anyway, in the course of
proving [the defendant's] entitlement to judgment and
refuting [the plaintiffs arguments], are not recoverable under
Rule 65A.
Tholen. 849 P.2d at 597. To the extent that fees would have been incurred regardless of
the TRO, they are not recoverable under Rule 65 A because they do not constitute an extra
expense caused by a wrongful injunctive order. Therefore, there is no justification for an
award of fees. Defendants argue that Rule 65A would be rendered meaningless if they
were not allowed to recover all the fees they request, including fees incurred in opposing
a motion that was never granted. Such is not the case. Clearly, Defendants are entitled to
those fees they incurred in resisting the TRO.3 Likewise, if the trial court had wrongfully
granted IKON a preliminary injunction, Defendants would be entitled to those fees
incurred in opposing the wrongful preliminary injunction.
Apparently because they recognize that they cannot satisfy the "but for" standard,
Defendants cite to Idaho law, which differs from Utah law on this point. See Brief of
Appellees at 19. Idaho law has no application to the instant case. Moreover, even under

327076 2
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Idaho law the recovery Defendants seek is only available where the fees were incurred In
dissolving a [wrongful] restraining order." Durrant v. Chnstensth,
(Idaho 1W01

- 4 o/

Bcciiust lis expLmul above, Defendants did not dissolve or seek to

dissolve tin TRO, Idaho law is as unavailing to Defendants as is Utah law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons stated in IK1" >N \s opening b? id ftii
trial court's Order Granting J ^tcniln^'

Renewed Molion for Award of Attorneys' Fees

and Costs should be reversed. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for an
award of fees and costs limited to those incurred by Defendants in connection with the
TRO, excluding those fees and costs incurred by Defendants in opposing IK'(DM "is. mm ion
for a preliminary injunction
star

'''vddifioiicilh, Ihr ln.il in ml -Jui ii<! .ippls the "but for"

f fees and costs under Rule 65A.

3 In light of Miller v. Martineau, IKON does not dispute that Defendants are entitled to
recover fees and costs incurred in connection with the TRO, including its stipulated
extension.
iinn-ia
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13

DEREK LANGTC
W. MARK GA^

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
IKON Office Solutions, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thig^ffi(day of March, 2000, 1 cuised to he mailed, first
class, postage prepaid i^ e inn ,inil t <>nn i u»pi»^ of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT
J. Michael Hansen
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
Attorneys for Uinta Business Systems, Inc.
215 South State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab A

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IKON" OFFICE SOLUTIONS, I N C . ,
Plaintiff,

vs.
DAVID

CROOK, e t

al,

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Counsel:
Defendant's Counsel;

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 970904077CV
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
Reporter: VIDEO 8:33 AM
July 9, 1997

Derek Langton/W. Mark Gavre
J. Michael Hansen/Claudia Berry/David Cutt

The above-entitled case comes before the Court for evidentiary
hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. The appearances
are as shown above.
The Court hears opening statements from
respective counsel(8:34). Plaintiff calls Patricia Peas (9:00),
Robert Petersen (10:15), Jeff Hill (10:30), Joseph Weis (10:55),
David Crook (11:40), Jan Warner (1:35) and David Turner (1-35) V ho
are sworn, their direct testimony is proffered by counsel and they
sore cross examined. Exhibits are offered and received.
Depositon
of Joseph Weis and David Crook are published. Plaintiff rests
(2:00)

Defendant motions for directed verdict which is argued tn Uu
and submitted.
Based on the testimonies, evidence, and arguments of counsex,
the Court grants defendant's motion for directed verdict. The
temporary restraining order is dismissed. Counsel for defendants
are instructed to prepare proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law and order consistent with the Courtfs ruling.

TabB

-ILtbuistniuibtmift
Thirrt liiHirial District

STTRMTTTKn BY:
J. MICHAEL HANSEN, Esq. (#1339)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037)
BLAKE D. MILLER, Esq. (#4070)
of and for
SUrTTERAXLAND
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801)532-7300
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS, INC., an
Ohio corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DAVID L. CROOK, an individual,
DAVID TURNER, an individual,
GINGER SEAMAN, an individual,
ROBERT L. PETERSEN, an individual,
MATTHEW HILL, an individual,
JEFFREY R. HILL, an individual,
NICHOLAS MADSEN, an individual,
LOUISE MADSEN, an individual,
CINDY COMPANA, an individual,
JENNIFER R. MILLER, an individual,
and UINTA BUSINESS SYSTEMS,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

Civil No. 970904077
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

The Motion of IKON Office Solutions, Inc. CKON") for a Preliminary Injunction,
pursuant to Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was heard by the Court on July 9, 1997.
IKON was represented by its counsel, Derek Langton, Esq. and W. Mark Gavre, Esq..
Defendants David L. Crook, David Turner, Ginger Seaman, Robert L. Petersen, Matthew
Hill, Jeffrey R. Hill, Nicholas Madsen, Louise Madsen, Cindy Compaiia, Jennifer R. Miller
and Uinta Business Systems, Inc. (collectivelyreferredto as "Defendants") were represented
by their counsel, J. Michael Hansen, Esq. and Claudia F. Berry, Esq. At the hearing, the
Court heard the testimony of Patricia A. Pease, Robert L. Petersen, Jeffrey R. Hill, Joseph P.
Weis, David L. Crook, Jann Warner and David Turner through proffers presented by counsel
and by cross-examination.

Upon completion of IKON's presentation of its evidence,

Defendants moved for a Directed Verdict in accordance with Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Court, having considered all exhibits and testimony presented by IKON, having
heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and based thereon and good
cause appearing
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Directed Verdict is granted
and IKON's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied. The Temporary Restraining Order
entered by the Court on June 18, 1997 is hereby dissolved.
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DATED this

) P. ^ day of

MJ-^j^/t t_* §r

1997.

BY THE COURT:

M. STIRBA
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

Derek Langton, Esq.
W. Mark Gavre, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KON Office Solutions, Inc.
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